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Vice, Virtue, and Memory:  
The Question of Fairness at Nuremberg 
 





At the end of World War II more than 
thirty-five million people—mostly civilians 
—were killed by the Allied and Axis powers. 
Therefore, the Nazi regime exterminated six 
million Jews in their concentration camps 
alone, and someone had to be held account-
able. 1  Nazi leaders were prosecuted in the 
Nuremberg trials, beginning with the 1945 
trial before the International Military Tri-
bunal. The 1945 trial not only initiated a 
series of other trials, but it also held ac-
countable twenty-two major figures of the 
Third Reich, charging them with four main 
indictments: crimes against the peace, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and con-
spiracy to commit any of these crimes.2  
The Palace of Justice in Nuremberg is 
remembered today as an institution that 
brought to justice those who committed or 
oversaw unforgivable crimes. However, I 
argue that the trials were biased for three 
reasons. First, the prosecution, headed by 
Robert Jackson from the United States of 
America, had considerably more latitude 
with the bench in preparing witnesses, cross-
examinations, and preparing arguments com-
pared to the defendants’ counsel(s). Second, 
the defence lacked adequate time and 
facilities to prepare and present a reasonable 
defence and were not afforded fair due 
process. Finally, the unpreparedness of the 
defence counsel, the spoliation of evidence 
by the prosecution and the impartiality of the 





The International Military Tribunal was 
established under the London Charter which 
was an agreement by the major ally nations.3 
Some critics condemned the use of judicial 
procedures to determine guilt and impose 
punishment of the war criminals, urging that 
to do so would be to turn a court into a 
political instrument by which the victors 
exercised their power to punish the defeated. 
As an example, Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone 
from the United States of America privately 
labeled the trial as a “high grade lynching 
party.”4 However, Levy and Sznaider point 
out that the symbolism of good and evil to 
many individuals during the aftermath of the 
Holocaust and especially during the Nurem-
berg trials represented to them remembrance 
and memory for those that perished in the 
war.5 Therefore, the outcome of the Nurem-
berg trials represented either the triumph of 
good, or evil.  
 
THE UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE 
DEFENCE COUNSEL 
Kiegan E. Lloyd was an international vir-
tual exchange student from Luther College 
at the University of Regina in Regina, Sas-
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uary to May 2021. Kiegan is completing a 
Bachelor of Arts honours degree in History 
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The twenty-two defendants at Nuremberg 
were given a thirty-day period to prepare 
their defense before the trial began. The 
German lawyers assigned as defence counsel 
were acquainted with German legal pro-
cedure, not the Anglo-American trial proce-
dures that were used throughout the 
Nuremberg Trials. The defence counsel had 
to quickly familiarise themselves with the 
Anglo-American accusatory model. 6  With 
only thirty days the counsel would have been 
primarily focused on looking through evi-
dence and building their case with little time 
to get accustomed to trial procedure. This 
disadvantaged the defence counsel during the 
trial. They were often criticized by their legal 
counterparts and media for being “clumsy 
and unimaginative.”7  
The prosecution had an enormous 
quantity of German documentation to use as 
evidence in the trial. A group of military 
personnel established by the Allies were 
tasked with seizing and preserving all ma-
terial German documents, records, and 
archives in preparation for the trial. By 
November 1945, the prosecution had over 
17,000 pages of oral evidence, and over 
22,000 pages of written evidence. The 
prosecution subsequently submitted approx-
imately 12,000–15,000 pages to the Tri-
bunal. 8  One of the biggest deprivations of 
due process rights was the defendants' lack of 
access to evidence held by the prosecution 
prior to the trial. This is a direct denial of the 
right to adequate facilities to prepare a 
defence. The prosecution had thoroughly 
searched the German archives and had seized 
all evidence relevant to their case. The 
remaining documents (of which there were 
few) were left for the defence to use. Even 
some of the most crucial and possibly ex-
onerating material was not made available to 
the defence. 9  Occupying authorities barred 
the access of defence counsel to document 
archives, and they were unable to make the 
investigations necessary to form their de-
fences. Even while the trial was in progress, 
access to material documentation remained 
difficult for the defence because often their 
requests were delayed.10  
 
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE 
PROSECUTION 
The lack of access to documents was 
often because of the deliberate withholding 
of evidence by the prosecution. Initially, 
Justice Jackson indicated the willingness of 
the prosecution to make evidence available to 
the defence. When the Tribunal directed 
Jackson to provide the defense with all the 
evidence, he was reluctant to do so. Before 
the defence could access any documentary 
evidence, the prosecution ordered that the 
defense counsel must first state what they 
were looking for and then make a specific 
request. No indexes or summaries were 
provided; therefore, without knowing what 
the documents contained, defence counsel 
was unable to make any sort of specific 
request. When defence counsel did request 
copies of documents from the prosecution, 
they had often “disappeared,” or were made 
available in insufficient quantities, in-
complete, not translated and days too late.11 
During the trial, Justice Jackson suggested 
that the defence should not be permitted to 
read its documents into the records, and 
instead should be limited to submitting the 
document books to the Judges. Dr. Dix the 
counsel for Hjalmar Schacht addressed the 
Court in response: 
I cannot consider it just and I cannot 
consider it fair if the prosecution had the 
right, for months, not only once but 
sometimes repeatedly and often, to bring 
their evidence to the knowledge of the 
public…The defence counsel must and 
would consider it a severe and intolerable 
limitation of the defence, if, contrary to 
the procedure exercised so far by the 
prosecution, it were deprived of the 
possibility of presenting, in its turn, at 
2
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least the relevant parts of its own 
documentary evidence to the Tribunal 
verbally and with comments.12  
As a result of the evidential rules, the 
Tribunal accepted ex parte witness affidavits 
from the prosecution, though they deprived 
the defendants the right of cross-
examination. 13  Another issue faced by the 
defence was that they faced language and 
translation difficulties, which exacerbated the 
time pressures in preparing the case. When 
the defence requested copies of documen-
tation from the prosecution, they were often 
provided only in English. Once the docu-
ments were eventually translated, errors in 
the translations were found.14  
 
IMPARTIALITY OF THE TRIBUNAL 
JUDGES 
The equality of the trial regarding the 
legal procedure can also be questioned. As 
previously mentioned, the trial ran according 
to Anglo-American legal proceedings a 
method unfamiliar to the defendants and their 
counsel. This left the defence at a distinct 
disadvantage compared to the prosecution. 
There was no equality between the 
prosecution and the defence regarding the 
trial procedure adopted. In fact, the reliance 
on documentary evidence disadvantaged the 
defence because of the sheer quantity of 
documents the prosecution submitted as 
evidence. There was no real equality of 
manpower between the parties. 15  A major 
obstacle for the defense and impacting a fair 
trial was the one-sidedness of the charges. 
The Nuremberg Trial is widely criticized for 
not allowing the tu quoque defence, which 
meant that the Allies could not be charged 
with the offences they were charging the 
defendants with, despite having committed 
them. To prevent Allied acts being called into 
question, the prosecution-based charges 
solely on German documentation. The defen-
dants were prohibited from presenting evi-
dence that implicated the Allies in any war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or crimes 
against the peace. 16  Furthermore, the 
Tribunal at Nuremberg was not an 
independent body because there was a 
substantial overlap between lawmaker, pro-
secutor, and judge. Not only were there 
overlaps in the administration of justice at 
Nuremberg, the law makers, prosecutors and 
Tribunal Judges were all from the victorious 
Allied nations. The defence had strong 
objections against this: 
[T]he defense consider it their duty to 
point out at this juncture another 
peculiarity of this Trial which departs 
from the commonly recognised principles 
of modern jurisprudence. This one party 
to the proceedings is all in one: creator of 
the statute of the Tribunal and of the rules 
of law, prosecutor and judge.17 
The impartiality of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
can be questioned regarding the four judges 
on the Bench and their prejudice.  
At the opening session of the trial, the 
four Judges professed, “I solemnly declare 
that I will exercise all my powers and duties 
as a member of the International Military 
Tribunal honourably, impartially, and con-
scientiously” 18  While great efforts were 
made to honour this declaration, and such 
efforts were often successful, the impartiality 
of the Tribunal remains a contentious 
element of the trial. The victorious nations of 
the War sat on the Tribunal to judge the 
defeated. United States Senator Robert Taft 
declared, “The trial of the vanquished by the 
victors cannot be impartial.” 19  The Allies 
suffered tremendous losses during the war at 
the hands of the Germans. The argument is 
that the victors would not be well equipped to 
judge the German war leaders because they 
would not be free from “hatred, passion and 
national prejudice.” 20  As citizens of the 
victorious nations, the Judges occasionally 
interacted with members of the prosecution. 
For example, during the trial, Soviet pro-
secutor Andrei Vyshinsky came to Nurem-
3
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berg to work with the prosecution. While he 
was visiting, a party was held in his honour, 
which the prosecution and Tribunal Judges 
all attended. Therefore, these types of inter-
action would have made impartiality difficult 
to maintain.21   
 
CONCLUSION 
Each of these the discussions of 
unpreparedness of the defence counsel, the 
equality between the prosecution and de-
fense, the impartiality of the tribunal jud-ges 
and the spoliation of evidence by the 
prosecution all contributed to the heavy 
burden placed on the defense counsel(s) 
shoulders and as result these burdens im-
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